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ABSTRACT
In evaluating the effect of an R&D subsidy we need to know what the subsidized firm would
have spent on R&D had it not received the subsidy. Using data on Israeli manufacturing firms in
the 1 990s we find evidence suggesting that the R&D subsidies granted by the Ministry of Industry and Trade
stimulated long-run company-financed R&D expenditures: their long-run elasticity with respect to R&D
subsidies is 0.22.Atthe means of the data, an extra dollar of R&D subsidies increases long-run company-
financed R&D expenditures by 41 cents (total R&D expenditures increase by 1.41 dollars). Although the
magnitude of this effect is large enough to justify the existence of the subsidy program, it is lower than
expected given the dollar-by-dollar matching upon which most subsidized projects are based. This "less than
full" effect reflects two forces: first, subsidies are sometimes granted to projects that would have been
undertaken even in the absence of the subsidy and, second, firms adjust their portfolio of R&D projects-











Does government policy play a role in influencing the rate and direction of technological change?
Most governments appear to believe so. A wide variety of instruments are used by governments
to foster technological change: tax cuts, subsidies to R&D, the formation of R&D consortia and
national R&D laboratories are but a few examples. In this paper we focus on the relationship
between government subsidies to R&D and company-financed R&D in Israel.
The Israeli experience is of interest because its high-tech sector boomed in the course of
the last decade, both by national and international standards. Government R&D and innova-
tion policies are perceived as crucial elements of this success story (Trajtenberg ,2000). Yet,
1there is no quantitative assessment of the effectiveness of these policies. This paper attempts
to close this gap by focusing on the question: Are R&D subsidies stimulating or displacing
company-financed R&D in Israeli manufacturing firms? The lessons learned from the Israeli
case should be of interest to countries implementing or contemplating the use of subsidy schemes
to promote R&D.1
An R&D subsidy can have a direct and an indirect effect on firm performance. The
direct effect comes about through the increase in total R&D expenditures, holding company-
financed R&D constant. Griliches and Regev (1998) estimate the separate effects of subsidized
and company-financed R&D expenditures on output and productivity of Israeli manufacturing
firms. Their findings point to significant and, in some cases, very large effects of subsidized
R&D on output. The indirect effect operates through the response of company-financed R&D
expenditures to the subsidy. If the R&D subsidy displaces own R&D expenditures, the total
effect on productivity may be lower than what the Griliches and Regev estimates suggest. On
the other hand, if it stimulates own R&D expenditures then the effects of the subsidy are
magnified. Thus, an understanding of the relationship between R&D subsidies and company-
financed R&D is necessary for a correct assessment of the role of R&D subsidies in boostering
productivity.
The precise way in which R&D subsidies are administered is likely to make a difference.
In Israel, the largest R&D subsidy program is the one implemented by the Office of the Chief
Scientist (OCS) at the Ministry of Industry and Trade. Firms apply for an R&D grant on
a project by project basis. All firms intending to export part of the outcome of the R&D
project qualify for participation in the program. The vast majority of the subsidies granted
represent 50 percent of the agreed-upon R&D budget. Thus, upon approval of the project the
firm commits to match, dollar-by-dollar, the subsidy received by the OCS. If the project is
commercially successful, the firm pays the subsidy back in the form of royalties. Thus, the
grant becomes a loan conditional on the success of the project.
The R&D subsidy can be viewed as lowering the private cost of the project. Receiving
the subsidy may therefore turn an unprofitable project into a profitable one to be pursued by
the firm. Or it may speed-up the completion of a project already under way. If subsidized R&D
involves setting up or upgrading research facilities (labs) then the fixed costs of other current
and future R&D projects are lowered, increasing their probability of being undertaken. The
learning and know-how gained in the subsidized project can also spill-over to other current and
1For example, the R&D support given by the ATP in the U.S., by TEKES in Finland, by CDTI in Spain
and by the Norwegian government operate in a somewhat similar manner.
2future projects thereby enhancing their prospects of success. For all these reasons, the R&D
subsidy can stimulate current and future private R&D expenditures.2
Indeed, the standard rationale for government support of R&D is rooted in the belief
that some form of market failure exists that leads the private sector to underinvest in R&D
(Arrow, 1962; Nelson, 1959). To a large extent, underinvestment in R&D occurs because the
social benefits from new technologies are difficult to appropriate by the private firms bearing
the costs of their discovery, and because imperfect capital markets may inhibit firms from
investing in socially valuable R&D projects (Griliches, 1998; Romer, 1990). Publicly supported
R&D ought to be augmenting or complementing private R&D efforts. It would therefore be
surprising, and contrary to stated goals, if R&D subsidies were to substitute for private R&D.
Yet, some empirical evidence suggests that some substitution between private and gov-
ernment funded R&D does indeed occur. In the U.S., Wallsten (2000) showed that a subset of
publicly traded, young, technological-intensive firms, reduced their R&D spending in the years
following the award of a Small Business Innovation Research grant, while Busom (2000) finds
that in about 30 percent of the Spanish firms in her sample, public funding fully crowds out
privately financed R&D. On the other hand, Klette and Moen (1997) conclude that the R&D
subsidies were successfully targeted at firms that have significantly expanded their R&D ex-
penditures, and that there is little tendency for crowding out in their sample of high-technology
Norwegian firms.3
One way to rationalize the possibility of "crowding out" is to argue that government
bureaucrats are under strong pressure to avoid the appearance of "wasting" public funds and,
therefore, may tend to fund projects with higher success probabilities and with clearly identifi-
able results, i.e., projects that are likely to have high private rates of return. These are projects
that could have been financed by the firm either from internal or external funds suggesting that
the R&D subsidies are in fact superfluous and may be crowding out private R&D resources. If,
however, the funds released by the subsidy are invested in other R&D projects which, because
of liquidity constraints, could not have been undertaken before these funds became available,
the subsidy may be accomplishing its stated purpose, albeit in an indirect way.
Another channel through which publicly funded R&D projects may crowd out privately
financed R&D is through their effect on the price of inelastically supplied R&D inputs (David
2 terms"company-financed", "private" and "own" R&D expenditures are used interchangeably.
3David, Hall and Tool's (1999) review of recent studies suggest contradictory results on this issue. Drawing
general conclusions is not easy because of the differences in samples and in methodologies among the studies
reviewed.
3and Hall, 1999). Suppose the subsidy does indeed turn an unprofitable project into a profitable
one. Then, if the costs of hiring additional R&D personnel are high, the firm may decide to dis-
continue a previously profitable project. The commitment to undertake the subsidized project
may come on account of other non-subsidized projects. This factor may be of importance in
Israel because of the serious shortage of scientists and engineers in some high-tech areas.4
It is important to realize that from the firm's point of view, the R&D subsidy eases
possible liquidity constraints because it is cheaper to apply for a government subsidy than to
raise funds in the capital market. Thus, the firm views the R&D subsidy as a substitute source
of financing rather than as a stimulating force to do more R&D. Once a subsidy is received, and
the firm commits to undertake the subsidized R&D project, the firm can adjust its portfolio
of R&D projects initiating new ones and/or closing old ones. Any analysis of the effect of the
subsidy needs to take these changes into account.
As this discussion shows, the crux of the matter for evaluating the effect of the R&D
subsidy is to know what the firm would have spent on R&D had it not received the subsidy.
This counterfactual information, however, is not available. All the estimation methods used
in this paper essentially attempt to estimate the missing expected counterfactual by the mean
outcome of some group of firms.
Using data on Israeli manufacturing firms in the 1990s we find evidence suggesting that
the R&D subsidies granted by OCS stimulated company-financed R&D expenditures: their
long-run elasticity with respect to R&D subsidies is 0.22. At the means of the data, adding one
dollar of R&D subsidy increases long-run company-financed R&D expenditures by 41 cents
on average. Total R&D expenditures increase, of course, by 1.41 dollars. Although large
enough to justify the existence of the OCS subsidy program, the estimated effect is lower than
expected given the dollar-by-dollar matching upon which most subsidized projects are based.
This "less than full" effect reflects two inherent aspects of the subsidy program: first, subsidies
are sometimes granted to projects that would have been undertaken even in the absence of
the subsidy and, second, firms adjust their portfolio of R&D projects—closing or slowing down
non-subsidized projects—after the subsidy is received.
Section 2 defines what it is that we want to learn about the effects of R&D subsidies.
Section 3 describes the main features of the data analyzed in this paper and Section 4 presents
4David and Hall (1999) also identi' a set of "second-order" crowding out effects (e.g., firms may decrease
their own R&D in publicly funded areas because of anticipated lower returns due to the eventual disclosure of
the outcomes of publicly funded R&D projects) which are more relevant to government R&D contracts that
pursue specific (socially relevant) R&D projects than to R&D subsidies given to private firms to pursue their
own, private, research agenda.
4the empirical estimates of the effect of receiving an R&D subsidy on company-financed R&D
expenditures. In Section 5, the analysis is extended to the effects of the level of subsidy in the
context of a dynamic panel data model. Conclusions close the paper.
2 What is the R&D Subsidy Effect?
As stated in the introduction, this paper examines the effect of R&D subsidies on the level of
company-financed R&D expenditures. Specifically, we ask whether receiving a subsidy stimu-
lates or crowds out private R&D expenditures. In this section, we define what it is that we try
to measure.
The subsidy scheme in Israel, and in many other countries, is such that firms apply for
an R&D subsidy to a specific project. If the project is accepted, the firm must match the level
of the subsidy with its own funds (see Section 3 for details). Let D =1represent the event of
receiving a subsidy and let y denote the log of company-financed R&D expenditures. Let y0
and y' be the log of company-financed R&D expenditures when the project is not subsidized
(D =0)and when it is subsidized (D =1),respectively.5
Suppose subsidies are received at time 'r>to and we wish to estimate their impact on
time t1(> r)R&Dexpenditures, y1. The "gain" in company-financed R&D expenditures from
receiving a subsidy is z
—y.We would like to know Lj for each firm because it
measures the percentage difference between the observed R&D outlay and the outlay that the
firm would have incurred had it not received a subsidy—the "what if" outcome. Knowledge of
Lj would answer the question: what is the effect on the firm's private R&D expenditures at t1
of receiving a subsidy at r?
Twoissues arise when considering the computation of L. First, L cannot be computed
for any firm because data on the counterfactual are missing: for the same firm we observe either
or y' but never both variables at the same time. Thus, L has to be estimated. Let us
therefore assume that, conditional on the firm not having a subsidy at time to, receiving a





y°1,= 1,D0 =0)=E(1IDji= 1,D0 =0) (1)
5A drawback of using the binary indicator variable Dtoestimate the subsidy effect is that it does not reflect
the size of the R&D subsidy. The use of logs is motivated, in part, by this scale problem. In Section 5, we also
estimate the effect of the level of R&D subsidies on the level of own R&D expenditures
5Thus, even though we cannot compute the gain L for each firm because of the missing
counterfactual we can measure an average gain for the firms that received an R&D subsidy.
This effect is known in the evaluation literature as the "effect of treatment on the treated".
It measures the average percentage change in company-financed R&D expenditures between
what was actually observed among firms that received a subsidy at time 'r and what these firms
would have spent had the subsidy not been received.6'7
The estimation problem is that data on firms receiving support identify E(y'1 I-Ri=
1,D =0)but cannot identify the counterfactual E(y°1 I-R1= 1,=0).In Section 4 we
present different estimates of the parameter a. All the estimation methods essentially attempt
to estimate the expected counterfactual by the mean outcome of some group of firms. Doing
this requires additional information and assumptions.
The second issue is that of interpretation of the subsidy effect a. In defining a, we
implicitly assumed that the firm performs a single R&D project or that y represents R&D
expenditures at the project level. In practice, however, firms are simultaneously involved in
several R&D projects and the available data are usually on firm-level R&D expenditures, i.e.,
y comprises expenditures on all (subsidized and non-subsidized) R&D projects performed by
the firm. Is there anything useful that we can learn from estimates of a based on firm-level
R&D data?
In order to answer this question we need to take into account the possibilities of substi-
tution across different R&D projects within the firm. We do this by performing an accounting
decomposition that helps to trace out the effect of the R&D subsidy on the expenditures of sub-
sidized and non-subsidized projects. Although not a model in the usual sense, the accounting
framework is also helpful in emphasizing various economic factors affecting the performance of
the subsidy program and in providing a way to interpret the empirical estimates of Sections 4
6These expectations can be defined conditional on firms' characteristics (e.g., industry affiliation, size, tech-
nological area, etc.). The subsidy effect may, therefore, vary with these characteristics.
7Another possibility for assessing the effect of the R&D subsidy is by looking at the performance of firms
afterthesubsidy has been discontinued. Comparing the R&D expenditures of a firm without a subsidy to the
expenditures the firm would have incurred had the subsidy been continued is, however, uninformative regarding
the effectiveness of the subsidy program. To see this, assume that the flow of R&D subsidies stops because the
project is completed. Thus, comparing the (firm-level) R&D expenditures of a non-subsidized to a subsidized
firm reflects the expenditures on other non-subsidized R&D projects. Firms having completed their subsidized
projects may now be in a better technological and financial position than before the project was completed.
This would stimulate R&D and would imply a positive change in R&D expenditures. Alternatively, they may
realize that their efforts are not going to bear fruit and decide to cut-down on their R&D program. This would
imply a negative change in R&D. In any case, the effect being estimated is the effect of the outcome of the R&D
project, and not the effect of the subsidy itself. Knowledge of what a firm would have done were the subsidy to
be continued tells us nothing on whether the subsidized project would have been undertaken in the first place
in the absence of the subsidy.
6and 5.
Let us assume for analytical couveuieuce that the size of the R&D projects is fixed.8
The oniy decision the firm makes is whether to undertake the project or not. The firm has m
potential projects each one of size a, i =,1...,m. It is convenient to work with R&D expenditures
in levels—not in logs—so that a and Y are in levels. Company-financed R&D expenditures are
=>aix?
where x?isa binary variable indicating whether project i is undertaken or not when a subsidy
is not received.
Assume that the firm applies for a subsidy only to the flhh project.9 If the subsidy is
received the cost of the flhh project is an =Aan+ (1— A)an where A is the subsidized proportion




Note that receiving a subsidy can change the decision to operate any of the first (ii —1)
projects, and that the subsidized project (project ii) is always implemented, xj= 1,because
of the subsidy contractual agreement. The increase in company-financed R&D expenditures






When is the likely sign of z?Supposefirst that the subsidy does not change the decision
on the unsupported projects, xl— x? = 0for i =1,... ii—1.Then,
(1—A)an ifg=0
—Aan ifg =1
8This is probably not a bad assumption. Indeed, what constitutes a "project" is a moot point as the packaging
of R&D activities into projects is not well-defined and strategic considerations may affect this packaging when
applying for subsidy support.
analysis can be easily extended to cover cases where firms apply for subsidies to more than one project.
What we do no have is a model of the firm's decision on which projects to submit for R&D subsidies. Are firms
submitting their (privately) best projects for subsidies in the hope of using these funds to finance less atractive
projects or other non-R&D activities? An understanding of these issues can help in evaluating the subsidy
program and in designing more effective subsidy schemes.
7Clearly, zs is positive only when the subsidy causes the subsidized project to be im-
plemented, and zs is negative if the subsidized project would have been undertaken even in
the absence of the subsidy. A significantly negative estimate of Ls would then mean that the
subsidy crowds-out private R&D expenditures, whereas a significantly positive estimate means
that the subsidy stimulates private R&D.
When the decision to implement the other non-subsidized projects can change as a result
of receiving the subsidy, the mapping between the sign of Ls and the effect of the subsidy is not
so clear-cut. Without loss of generality, let us assume that only the decision on the (ii —i)th
project can be changed. Then
1.a_ + (1 —A)aif=0and (x?i—1 — = 1
2. —a_+ (1 —A)aif =0and (X?i—1 — = —1
'•: O_i,-icl 0 — —ii—anu —X—i—
A c 0_i All 0 —afl_l—naflh1x_1anukx_l—x_l
The gain from the subsidy zs is definitely positive when both projects are implemented
as a result of receiving the subsidy as in case i(g = = 0and xi = = 1).This
is the best-case scenario: the R&D subsidy turns not only the subsidized project, but also
the non-subsidized one, into profitable projects. This may happen when the subsidized project
involves setting up or upgrading research facilities lowering the fixed costs of other current (and
future) non-subsidized R&D projects. There may also be a spillover of learning and know-how
gained in the subsidized project to other current (and future) R&D projects increasing their
prospects of success and thereby their profitability. Thus, spillover and "cost-sharing" effects
may encourage further R&D expenditures in other non-subsidized R&D projects.
On the other hand, an opposite effect may occur when the firm lacks enough skilled R&D
workers or faces liquidity constraints that make it very costly to implement the (ii —i)thproject
along with the subsidized project to which it is committed. The firm may find it profitable
to discontinue the non-subsidized project (case 2). Company-financed R&D expenditures may
decrease or increase as a result of the subsidy depending on the relative size of both projects.
Cases 3 and 4 involve cases where the subsidized project would have been undertaken
even without the subsidy (xg= 1).In this respect, the subsidy is superfluous and this alone
8contributes a negative amount (equal to the subsidy) to the R&D gain Li. If, however, the
funds released by the subsidy Aa are used to implement an additional project which could not
have been previously financed because of liquidity constraints (say), and if this project is large
enough, then the subsidy effect may become positive. The size of the non-subsidized project
(an_i) may be larger than the subsidy (Aa) if receiving the R&D subsidy has some signal
value that lowers the costs of financing.10 The last case, where the (n —i)thproject is closed
down (j_1 =0)as a result of receiving the subsidy is difficult to rationalize on economic
grounds and so we rule it out as a feasible possibility.
In this framework, firms may react differently to the R&D subsidy. The subsidy's impact
depends essentially on the budget constraint faced by the firm and on the effects of relaxing
it, as described above. This means that the average effect of the subsidy on the subsidized
firms—the effect of treatment on the treated—may differ from the average effect of giving an
R&D subsidy to a randomly chosen firm (Heckman, 1995).
In light of this discussion, how do we interpret a finding of a positive c? When c> 0 the
subsidy stimulates company-financed R&D on average, either because new projects that would
not have been undertaken without the subsidy are presently undertaken, as in case (1), or
because even if some non-subsidized projects are closed-down there is still a positive net effect
of the subsidy. ci can even be positive when the subsidy is superfluous and the released funds
are used to fund a larger project that could not have been implemented before the subsidy
funds became available as in case (3).
When ci =0,the subsidy does not, on average, displace nor stimulate private R&D
expenditures. The firm adjusts its portfolio of R&D projects to accommodate the subsidized
project which it is committed to perform. The trade-off between the subsidized and non-
subsidized projects balances-off on average. On the other hand, ci < 0 means that the subsidy
is displacing—crowding out—private R&D effort, either because not all of the released resources
from subsidizing a superfluous project are directed to other R&D project but to other activities
such as marketing, production, etc., as in case (3), or because the subsidized project purely
crowds out other non-subsidized projects, as in case (2).
Thus, the sign of a gives us information on the qualitative aspect of the relationship
between subsidies and private R&D. a is estimated in Section 411 The magnitude of this
10Note also that there may be spillover and cost-sharing effects between the two projects but these cannot be
attributed to the subsidy because the subsidized project would have been undertaken anyway.
that when a =0,total R&D expenditures (private + subsidized) increase by the size of the subsidy,
whereas when a > 0 (a < 0) total R&D expenditures increase by more (less) than the subsidy.
9relationship is also of considerable interest. Recall that in most cases the subsidy is matched
dollar-by-dollar by the firm. If nothing else changed, we should observe an increase in company-
financed R&D expenditures relative to the non-subsidy case equal to the amount of the subsidy
provided, of course, that the subsidy is not superfluous. This is probably the rationale behind
the subsidy schemes in Israel and in other countries. But things can go "wrong": the subsidy
may be superfluous and/or the firm may adjust its R&D portfolio in response to the subsidy.
In Section 5, we estimate the marginal effect of the R&D subsidy.
Note that we restricted ourselves to the effect of the subsidy on the firm's own R&D
expenditures. Subsidies may also carry implications towards other non-R&D activities, both
contemporaneously and over time, and, through interfirm spillovers or rivalry channels, sub-
sidies to one firm may have effects on other firms' R&D activities. These, however, are all
indirect effects which are not the main goal of the R&D subsidy program (except for its effects
on R&D employment). If the direct effects on the subsidized R&D project are negative or not
significant, the economic justification for continuing with the subsidy program in its present
form is considerably undermined even if the indirect effects are quantitatively more important




The Israeli government funnels its support of R&D projects through several channels. The
most important venue are the R&D grants given by the Office of the Chief Scientist (OCS)
at the Ministry of Industry and Trade as mandated by the "Law for the Encouragement of
Industrial Research and Development" from 1984.12Sixtypercent of all government support
to R&D is implemented by the OCS (Avnimelech and Margalit, 1999).
Trajtenberg (2000) analyzes the operation of the OCS in detail. The volume of grants
administered by the OCS was 120 current million dollars in 1988, it increased steeply up to
the mid 1990's and then leveled off at about 310 current million dollars per year. The per year
number of firms applying for subsidies varied between 580 and 780 during 1991-1999, and over
6500 projects were approved since 1995. The OCS approves a firm's application if the project
satisfies some specified criteria based on technological and commercial feasibility. About 70
12The purpose of the law is "to encourage and support industrial R&D in order to enhance the development
of local-based industry..., to improve Israel's balance of trade..., and to create employment opportunities in
industry...".
10percent of all applications are approved. In fact, the OCS is mandated by law to subsidize all
eligible proposals; there is no ranking of the proposals. Moreover, the principle of "neutrality"
precludes the OCS to select projects according to fields or any other such considerations.
Grants from the OCS are provided as a percentage of the estimated project-specific R&D
expenditures. This percentage varies between 30 and 66 depending on the circumstances. If the
goal of the R&D project is to create a new project or industrial process or to make significant
improvements in existing ones, the grant is 50 percent of the approved R&D expenditures. If
it is just to improve an existing product, the grant is 30 percent. Exceptions to this rule are
start-up companies which receive 66 percent of the approved R&D expenditure (up to $250,000
per year) during the initial two years, and firms in "preferred" development areas receiving 60
percent of the approved R&D budget. The vast majority of the projects are supported at 50
percent: essentially, firms match the R&D subsidy dollar-by-dollar.
When a government-assisted R&D project results in a commercially successful product,
the developers are obliged to pay royalties. The royalties are a percentage of the revenues
derived from the project going from 3 percent during the first three years, to 4 percent over
the next three years, and remain at 5 percent in the seventh year and any year thereafter.13
The OCS uses the proceeds of the royalties to fund future R&D projects. The share of
royalties received out of total grants has been increasing very rapidly from about 10 percent in
1990 to 19 percent in 1995 and 41 percent in 1999, and is therefore becoming a very important
element in the OCS annual budget for R&D support.
In addition to the "standard" R&D grant, the OCS also gives grants for the execution of
detailed feasibility studies regarding the marketing potential of R&D projects, and also funds
the formation of business plans for start-up and young companies based upon the conclusions
of the feasibility studies. Grants are also given to assist in the creation of beta-sites (mostly)
overseas to test the new product in "real-life" situations.
The OCS and the Israel Center for Research and Development (Matimop) also implement
bi-national programs supporting joint projects between companies or individual researchers.
Although the most important program is the BIRD (US-Israel B i-national Foundation), Israel
also has bi-national R&D agreements with a number of countries and several agreements with
the European Union (e.g., participation in the Eureka network).
Another two channels used by the government to fund R&D activities is through the
Magnet Program which supports the establishment of R&D consortia to carry out research
in generic pre-competitive technologies, and through the establishment of technological incu-
131n any case, the royalties shall not exceed the amount of the grant plus interest.
11bators that enable novice entrepreneurs with innovative concepts to translate their ideas into
commercial products. Starting in 1992 the government also proved instrumental in developing
venture capital funds that play an increasingly pivotal role in the evolution of the high-tech
industry in Israel (Avnimelech and Margalit, 1999)
3.2 Description of the Data
The data used in this paper are a subset of the data analyzed in Griliches and Regev (1999).
The dataset is restricted to manufacturing firms doing R&D, i.e., to firms appearing at some
point in the Surveys of Research and Development in Manufacturing conducted by the Cen-
tral Bureau of Statistics during the period 1990-1995. It includes firm-level data on sales,
exports, employment, total R&D expenditures, R&D subsidies, and other characteristics on
approximately 180-190 R&D-doing firms per year.
The data on R&D subsidies are the data obtained directly from the Survey of Research
and Development questionnaire. The survey breaks down the external sources of R&D financing
into three categories: 1) grants from the OCS at the Ministry of Industry and Trade, 2) financing
from the bi-national Israel-American Fund, and 3) financing from other government sources.
We consider all three sources together and label them "R&D subsidies". As mentioned in the
introduction, the OCS subsidy program is the largest form of subsidization. During the sample
period, grants from the OCS accounted for about 87 percent of all government support.
It is important to realize that the R&D expenditures and R&D subsidy data is at the firm
level and may involve one or more projects. Moreover, there is no information in our dataset
on firms that applied for subsidies and were denied. These firms cannot be distinguished from
those that do not apply for subsidies.14
Tables 1-6 describe the main features of the sample data as pertain to R&D subsidies. In
Table 1 we observe that company-financed R&D expenditures increased in every year through
out the 1990-95 period, even though most of their increase occurred between 1992 and 1993.
Their annual rate of growth was 7.2 percent. This pace was matched, on average, by the growth
in R&D subsidies at 8.4 percent at an annual rate. As a result, the ratio of R&D subsidies to
total R&D expenditures remained stable at about 20 percent.
14The OCS database contains project level information and a list of denied applicants. Regretfully, these data
have yet to be matched to the R&D surveys in a coherent manner.
12Table 1: Aggregate R&D Expenditures







1990 739.4 188.4 0.20
1991 776.7 206.1 0.21
1992 867.1 198.8 0.19
1993 1029.5 246.1 0.19
1994 1039.2 288.3 0.22
1995 1048.2 281.5 0.21
Figures in millions of 1990 NIS aggregated
from firm-level data using sampling weights.
The subsidy ratio in Table 1 does not differentiate among firms receiving and not receiving
subsidies. The number of firms with positive R&D in the sample hovers around 165-195 per
year and about 60 percent of them receive some kind of subsidy (Table 2).





subsidy Mean Total R&D ratio
for firms with subsidy > 0
Meansubsidy
Private R&D ratio
1990 183 59.6 0.31 0.58
1991 196 56.6 0.32 0.63
1992 185 63.2 0.29 0.46
1993 190 59.5 0.27 0.48
1994 186 57.5 0.27 0.57
1995 163 60.1 0.26 0.48
Among the supported firms, the mean subsidy ratio is about 30 percent in the first years
of the sample but appears to be declining over time.15 Median subsidy ratios (not shown) are
almost identical to the mean ratios. Subsidized R&D represented, on average, 63 percent of
company-financed R&D in 1991, and was down to 48 percent in 1995. Thus, R&D subsidies
constitute a significant portion of the R&D effort of manufacturing firms. Evidently, subsidies
are not a marginal source of funding.
Table 3 shows that most of the R&D activity in the manufacturing sector is undertaken
by subsidized firms, highlighting the role of the OCS in the development of the Israeli high-tech
sector. Non-subsidized firms—about 40 percent of all R&D firms—account for only 10-15 percent
of total R&D expenditures. The largest share (about 40 percent) of total R&D expenditures
corresponds to the 20 percent of all firms that are medianly subsidized.
15Small firms (up to 100 employees) have mean subsidy ratios between 30 and 35 percent, while the mean
ratio for larger firms (above 300 employees) is 25 percent.
13Table 3: Distribution of Total R&D by Subsidy Ratio
Year Subsidy Ratio (S)
S==00<S0.150.15<S0.30.3<S
1990 0.11 0.24 0.38 0.27
1991 0.16 0.25 0.25 0.34
1992 0.16 0.19 0.38 0.28
1993 0.11 0.23 0.46 0.20
1994 0.09 0.18 0.43 0.30
1995 0.07 0.23 0.37 0.33
Class Size0.41 0.13 0.20 0.26
Class size is the proportion of firms in each subsidy class in all firm-years observations.
Subsidized firms are larger than non-subsidized firms (Table 4). They spend, on average,
about 5.5-8.5 millions of 1990 NIS in R&D, and employ around 400 employees. Non-subsidized
firms, on the other hand, spend considerably less in R&D—1.5-2.0 millions of 1990 NIS—and
employ about half the number of workers than their subsidized counterparts. The differences
persist, although less significantly, after controlling for firm size. Although suggestive, these
differences are likely to be biased estimates of the subsidy effect because they do not account
for the endogeneity of the R&D subsidy (see Section 4).
14Table 4: Firm Characteristics by Support Status
Mean Own R&D expenditures
Year Firms with Firms without Difference
subsidy subsidy
1990 5609.1 1302.4 4306.7*
1991 5365.2 1815.3 35499*
1992 5816.5 2381.9 3434.6*
1993 7337.2 1755.8 5581.2*
1994 7891.4 1403.4 6488.0*







MeanOwn R&D Expendtures per Worker
1990 19.3 14.2 5.1*
1991 18.5 18.0 0.4
1992 22.1 15.9 6.2
1993 22.0 11.5 10.6*
1994 24.1 9.1 14.6*
1995 24.6 9.1 15.5*
Own R&D in thousands of 1990 NIS. *Rejects the null hypothesis of equality of means against
one-sided alternative at 5% significance level.
R&D subsidies are not distributed equally among R&D performers. Indeed, the distribu-
tion of R&D subsidies is highly skewed. Table 5 indicates that the largest firm quartile—around














220.6Table 5: Distribution of R&D Subsidies by Firm Size
Year Employment
0—5051—100101—300 301+
1990 0.06 0.06 0.22 0.66
1991 0.05 0.07 0.21 0.67
1992 0.04 0.06 0.22 0.68
1993 0.04 0.06 0.10 0.80
1994 0.02 0.05 0.12 0.81
1995 0.03 0.03 0.13 0.82
Class Size0.30 0.18 0.29 0.23
Employment is the number of man-hours. Class size is the proportion
of firms in each employment class in all firm-year observations.
On the other hand, small firms—employing less than 100 workers—receive at most 12
percent of all R&D subsidies, even though they represent about half the firms doing R&D.
This suggests that the performance of the R&D subsidy program as a whole is tied to the
fortunes of these 25-30 firms. It is, therefore, of interest to allow for a differential effect of R&D
subsidies by firm size.
Table 6 shows the distribution of R&D subsidies by industry. At first glance it may
appear that R&D support is biased towards electronics and chemical firms but, as the numbers
in parentheses show, 95 percent of all R&D is performed by firms in these two industries.
Table 6: Distribution of R&D Subsidies
(Total R&D Expenditures) by Industry
Year ElectronicsChemicalsMachineryOthers
1990 0.82 (0.80)0.17 (0.14)0.01 (0.03)0 (0.03)
1991 0.86 (0.80)0.12 (0.14)0.02 (0.03)0 (0.02)
1992 0.85 (0.82)0.12 (0.14)0.02 (0.03)0 (0.01)
1993 0.81 (0.75)0.17 (0.20)0.01 (0.03)0 (0.02)
1994 0.85 (0.77)0.13 (0.18)0.02 (0.03)0 (0.02)
1995 0.83 (0.78)0.15 (0.17)0.01 (0.03)0 (0.01)
Class Size 0.48 0.28 0.13 0.11
Others inlcude the Food, Paper and Printing,Textiles and Light industries.
Class size is the proportion of firms in each industry class in all firm-year observations.
In short, about 60 percent of the R&D performers receive some kind of subsidy, which on
average represents 30 percent of the firm's total R&D expenditures and, therefore, constitutes a
significant source of funding for R&D projects. Subsidized firms are on average larger (in terms
of employment and R&D size) and more R&D intensive than non-subsidized firms, and almost
all subsidized firms belong to the Electronics and Chemical industries. About 85 percent of the
R&D activity in the manufacturing sector is conducted by firms receiving some R&D subsidy,
16but the distribution of subsidies is highly skewed with about 75 percent of all the subsidies
going to the 20 percent largest firms.
4 The Effect of Receiving an R&D Subsidy
4.1 Simple Difference Estimator
A straightforward approach to estimating ci is to argue that mean R&D expenditures of the non-
supported firms, E(y°ID =0,D_1 =0),may be a reasonable estimate of the counterfactual
E(y° I=1,D_1 =0).This implies that an estimator of c could be the simple difference in
mean own R&D expenditures by support status
DO1OO (3)
where the means are taken over the two groups of firms defined by the subsidy status in period
t, conditional on not having received a subsidy at t —1.16
Table 7 shows the estimated means of log own R&D expenditures for the two groups of
firms (columns (1) and (2)) and their difference in column (3). The subsidy effects are very
imprecisely estimated and vary considerably in sign and magnitude over the years.17
Table 7: Difference by Support Status
Mean Own R&D Expenditures (number of firms)







19915.75 (11) 6.00 (54) -0.25 (.51)
1992 6.30 (2) 6.20 (59) 0.10 (1.22)
19935.79 (11) 6.18 (40) -0.39 (.60)
1994 6.57 (8) 5.83 (54) 0.74 (.67)
19955.92 (11) 5.92 (51) 0.00 (.54)
Number of firms in parenthese in cols. 1 and 2. Standard errors in parentheses in col. 3.
The R&D subsidy appears to have no significant effect on company-financed R&D ex-
penditures of the supported firms: total R&D expenditures increase by the amount of the
subsidy.
16The superscripts denotes the subsidy status in period t —1and t, respectively.
17The difference (in sign) between column 3 and the last column in Table 4 is due to the conditioning on last
period subsidy status.
17This conclusion holds provided the identifying assumptions underlying the simple dif-
ference estimator are valid. This qualification begs the question: does this simple procedure






The simple difference of means, therefore, identifies a plus a potentially non-zero bias
term reflecting differences in R&D outlays between subsidy recipients and non-recipients. This
bias disappears if, conditional on=0,y is mean independent ofThat is, if
= =0)=E(ygD= =0) (5)
Under this assumption, the difference by support status estimator is an unbiased and consistent
estimator of a. If the subsidy were randomly assigned to the firms, D would be independent of
y0 by definition, and the bias disappears.
The subsidy, however, is not randomly assigned to firms and we therefore need to question
the validity of assumption (5). The identifying assumption (5) means that having received a
subsidy does not affect the level of the R&D project the firm would have undertaken had the
subsidy not been received. Only in this case, the mean R&D expenditures of the non-supported
firms—E(ygD =0, =0)—isan unbiased estimator of the counterfactual level of R&D
outlays—E(yg ID= 1,=0)—thelevel of R&D expenditures the supported firms would
have incurred had the subsidy been removed.
Assumption (5) will hold when there are no common or correlated factors determining the
probability of receiving a subsidy and the level of R&D expenditures. Therefore, assumption
(5) is overly strong and is bound to fail in the data. As observed in Section 3, the two groups of
subsidized and non-subsidized firms differ in many aspects (e.g., in size, in industry affiliation)
that are most likely to affect both the level of R&D expenditures directly and the probability of
receiving a subsidy. Thus, the difference in mean R&D by support status is not only capturing
the causal effect of the subsidy but also part of the effect of the excluded determinants of R&D
and D.
For example, if R&D subsidies are biased towards firms in electronics, and in this area
R&D expenditures are much larger than in other research fields then the bias term would be
18positive and the simple difference in means by support status overestimates the casual effect
of the R&D subsidy. In the same vein, suppose that liquidity-constrained firms are more likely
to apply for—and to receive—an R&D subsidy and to tighten their R&D expenditures. Then we
would expect the bias term to be negative and the simple difference in means by subsidy status
will underestimate the causal effect of the R&D subsidy. It may also be the case that, after
realizing that the particular R&D area being explored is unlikely to bear significant fruits, the
firm decides to cut down its R&D activities. This would imply that the firm is likely to have
its subsidies removed and to reduce its own R&D outlays and (3) would overstate the subsidy
effect.
In these examples, the independence assumption of R&D expenditures and subsidy sup-
port status cannot be sustained. The correlation between subsidies and R&D is not causal; it is
due to a third factor affecting both decisions. The examples therefore suggest that a potential
alternative to random assignment of the R&D subsidy could be to "control" or "account" for
the firm's industry, or for the firm's cash-flow and technological position so as to make R&D
expenditures and subsidy support independent, conditional on a set of firm characteristics.
4.2 Simple Difference Estimator Conditional on Covariates
If controlling for firms' characteristics eliminates all the differences in potential own R&D
expenditures among supported and non-supported firms then the missing counterfactual can
be consistently estimated by the mean R&D expenditures of the non-subsidized firms (after
controlling for differences in firms' characteristics). This is the "selection on observables"
assumption whereby selection into the R&D subsidy program is based on a set of observable
variables and possibly on unobserved variables uncorrelated with potential R&D expenditures,
E(yIx,= 1, D_1 = 0) = E(yIx,= 0, D_1 = 0) (6)
wherex is a vector of covariates.
Assumption (6) says that, given x, selection into the subsidy program is not based on
variables correlated with y.
To implement this approach we need to compute (3) at each value of x. Assuming linearity
of the conditional expectation of y given x and D, an equivalent procedure is to estimate a
from
yj= xj3 +Djci+ Ejj (7)
19with an OLS regression (see the Appendix).
Table 8: Difference by Support Status
given Covariates
Firms without subsidies in previous year
YearNo. of firms (s.e.)
1991 65 -0.55 (.37)
1992 52 -0.82 (1.22)
1993 49 -0.75 (.44)
1994 61 0.65 (.47)
1995 60 -0.41 (.42)
Standard errors in parentheses
Regression includes log employment, log sales and industry dummies.
In Table 8, we include industry affiliation, employment size, and sales to control for the
effect on R&D of observable firm characteristics that may be correlated with the probability of
receiving an R&D subsidy. The size variables—employment and sales—may capture some of the
effect of liquidity constraints.18 Adding covariates makes the estimated parameters Y1smaller
(more negative) and improves their precision, but they remain insignificantly different from
zero.
In general, however, there are 'unobserved characteristics that cannot be controlled for
which may lead to failure of (6). The technological position of the firm, for example, will fit
into this class of variables: it affects R&D expenditures and may also affect the probability
of receiving an R&D subsidy. Because R&D subsidies are not randomly assigned to firms,
and because it is likely that factors affecting both R&D expenditures and the probability of
receiving an R&D subsidy (and its level) remain uncontrolled for, the OLS estimator of ci from
(7) may not be a consistent estimator of the effect of the R&D subsidy on the supported firms.
In order to overcome this identification problem inherent in non-experimental data, we impose
restrictions on the process generating the data.
4.3 Difference in Differences (DID) Estimator
A first restriction is to assume that the unobserved characteristics (6j) potentially correlated
with the subsidy status can be decomposed into a firm-specific and time-specific effect. This
leads to an error-component specification ofModel (7) becomes,
(8)
18Klette and Moen (1997) relate optimal R&D expenditures to expected profitability (proxied by sales) and
subsidies. Because employment and sales are highly collinear usually only one of the regressors comes in positive
and significant. The sum of the estimated coefficients hovers around 0.7-0.8.
20where O is the firm-specific effect ,Ais a time-specific component common to all firms, and
jjisan i.i.d. zero mean random variable assumed to be uncorrelated with x.
Applying model (8) to firms without a subsidy at t —1,D_1 =0,and taking first
differences to remove firm-specific effects results in,
=LA+ /Xxj3+ciDj + /Xj (9)
which relates the growth rate in own R&D expenditures to the growth rates in the observed
and unobserved covariates and the subsidy dummy.
From (9) it follows that
E(yIx,= 1,D_1= 0)—E(/yI/x, = 0,D_1= 0) (10)
=a+ E(Aijx, =1,D_1= 0)—E(Aijx, = 0,D_1= 0)
It is clear now that, conditional on /xjandon =0,the expected difference
between the growth rates of subsidized and non-subsidized firms identifies a provided /jis
mean independent of
=1,D_1=0)= =0,D_1=0) (11)
The difference between assumptions (5) and (11) is that the latter allows for firm-specific
unobserved effects O (e.g., unobserved managerial skills or time-invariant efficiency levels) and
economy-wide shocks ) to affect both the level of company-financed R&D expenditures and
the support status of the firm. We can do this because the additivity assumption in (8) implies
that "same-firm" differences eliminate the firm-effects terms while "same-period" differences
eliminate the time-effects from the bias. In other words, the panel features of the data and
the error component assumption permit us to relax the selection on observables assumption
to allow for correlation between (time-invariant) firm-specific and time-specific effects and the
subsidy dummy variable D.
21This issue is closely related to the bias in the estimation of a attributed to the self-
selection of firms into the application process of the R&D subsidy program (Busom, 2000).
Not all firms apply for a subsidy. Firms decide to apply for a subsidy on the basis of their
expected profitability of applying relative to not applying. Projects satisfying a technological
and commercial feasibility criterion are eligible for a subsidy and, in fact, the OCS is mandated
by law to subsidize all eligible proposals. Seventy percent of all applications are approved.
As explained in Section 3, the procedure is non-competitive so that there is no ranking of the
proposals. Because grants are repaid only if success is achieved, it is possible that firms working
in riskier R&D areas will be more likely to apply for subsidies. For this and other reasons, firms
receiving an R&D subsidy do not constitute a random sample of firms from the population of
R&D doers. Because the characteristics that make a firm a recipient of an R&D subsidy are
likely to be correlated with the determinants of own R&D effort, we need to control for this
source of correlation.19
DID with covariates goes some ways towards solving this problem. First, it accounts
for common observed covariates affecting the decisions to apply for a subsidy, to be granted
one, and to do R&D. Second, it also takes account of permanent (time-invariant) differences
between successful and unsuccessful applicants, and non-applicants. Thus, if one believes that
part of the self-selection mechanism works through the observed covariates (e.g., industry, size)
and that, given these covariates, what determines whether or not a firm is granted a subsidy
are firm characteristics that stay more or less constant during the sample period (such as the
degree of risk in the R&D area in which the firm is involved), then the DID estimator is an ac-
ceptable estimation procedure. DID fails, however, to control for idiosyncratic factors affecting
simultaneously the level of R&D expenditures and the probability of receiving a subsidy.20
The difference-in-difference (DID) estimator is the sample version of (10),
=('(Xt)—vL(Xi_1)) —(°(Xt)—vi(Xt_i)) (12)
19We only observe recipient and non-recipient firms in the data. A recipient firm is one that applied and was
accepted to the subsidy program, the non-recipient firm may have applied for a subsidy and been denied or
may not have applied at all. The data at hand do not allow us to distinguish between denied applicants and
non-applicants.
20This approach handles the problem caused by the notion that more "successful" firms may be receiving more
R&D subsidies and doing more R&D. If the "success" profile of the firm is more or less constant during the
sample period then it differences-out in the DID estimator. If, however, receiving an R&D subsidy is associated
with the unexpected development of a particularly good idea which also leads to more R&D expenditures, then
the DID estimator is likely to be upward biased (more on this in Section 5).
22where the means are taken over the two groups of firms defined by the subsidy status in period
t, conditional on the subsidy status at t —1and on the value of x.
The DID estimator equals the difference between the mean R&D change between t —1
and t among the supported and non-supported firms, conditional on x. In Table 9 we present
first the DID estimates assuming j3 =0.Because of its simplicity this estimator is widely used
in practice.21
Table 9: DID Estimates of ci
Mean Own R&D Expenditures (number of firms)
Firms without subsidies in t —1














































The sample in each pair of years includes firms with positive R&D in both years.
The sample in each pair of consecutive years consists of all firms not receiving a subsidy
during year t —1,D_1= 0,and having positive R&D expenditures in both years. This
requirement ensures that the difference in the averages equals the average of the firm-specific
differences.22 For example, 65 firms doing R&D in 1990 and 1991 did not receive a subsidy
in 1990 (out of a total of 183 firms doing R&D). Eleven of them received a subsidy in 1991,
and reduced their own R&D expenditures by 27 percent on average. The average reduction in
own R&D expenditures among the remaining 54 firms was 18 percent. Thus, if the identifying
assumptions hold, the R&D subsidy caused a decrease of 9.0 percent in own R&D outlays.
21These estimates were computed from a least squares regression of Y on a firm-dummy, a year t dummy, and
for each pair of consecutive years; equation (8) imposing /3 =0.
22 speaking, this requirement is unnecessary. Some firms that did R&D and did not receive a subsidy in
year t —1stopped doing R&D the next year. Because the log of zero is not defined we excluded these firms from
the averages in both years. Including them in the average of the first year, or setting their R&D expenditures in
the second year to a very small positive number does not change the qualitative nature of the results.
23Repeating this exercise for every pair of consecutive years produces widely varying esti-
mates of the subsidy effect. Most estimates, however, are negative while the positive ones are
very small in magnitude. All of them are very imprecisely estimated. This is not surprising
given the small number of transitions in the data. For example, in 1992 only 2 firms received
an R&D subsidy out of the 61 firms that did not receive any subsidies in 1991.
In the more reasonable case of j30, the estimates in Table 9 can be justified only when
the covariates do not vary much across the two groups of firms. If the values of the covariates
differ among the two groups, and this is ignored, the DID estimator picks up the correlation
between these covariates and D.
A convenient way to control for different values of x, is to estimate ci from (8) in two
consecutive years, using panel data estimation methods. Specifically, we need data for two
periods, a "pre-treatment" period and a "post-treatment" period. A fixed-effects estimator of
(8) generates consistent estimators of j3 and ci provided the identifying assumptions hold.23 To
improve the precision of the estimator we pool the data over the 5 years of data in the sample
(assuming time-invariant parameters) using only observations for which D_1 =0.Table 10
presents these results.
Table 10: Pooled DID Estimates of ci, 1990-95
Eauation (8)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
= 1 -0.194 (.156)-0.192 (.159)-0.167 (.159) (.168)
D_1 =1 — — 0.378* (.190)
Emp.
— 0.154 (.195)0.146 (.204) -0.108 (.239)
Sales — — 0.224 (.158) 0.285 (.208)
Within R2 0.040 0.042 0.052 0.087
N (firms)326 (136)324 (136)319 (134) 214(103)
Standard errors in parentheses. Year dummies included. A *(**)indicates different from 0 at 5% (10%) significance level.
In cols. (1)-(3) we use only firms with =0,while in col. (4) we use only firms with =0.
In columns (1)- (3), the subsidy effect comes in negative and of considerable size, about
-19 percent. This estimate is, by and large, consistent with the results in Table 9. Even though
pooling the data gives more precise estimates, they are still insignificantly different from zero at
conventional significance levels. Not surprisingly, larger firms spend more on R&D expenditures
but the size elasticity of R&D is well below unity implying that company-financed R&D by
employee decrease with the size of the firm.24
231n section 5, we present GMM estimators of the paramteres based on the first-difference equation.
24Note also that the low R2's indicate that most of the within-firm variation in own R&D expenditures is
largely unrelated to changes over time in scale.
24Usually (subsidized) R&D projects are conducted over a number of years and the grant
money is transferred to the firm accordingly. This means that the event "D =1,D_1 =
1,.. . , Dii_q=1"is probably a more accurate representation of the event "receiving a subsidy"
than the single indicatorAll this suggests that lags ofshould be added to model (8) in
order to capture the full effect of the subsidies. Column (4) adds one lag of the subsidy indicator
to the regression. The results change dramatically. Subsidies do indeed displace private R&D
expenditures by 30 percent but this substitution is completely reversed later on. When the
actual implementation of the subsidized project is delayed or spans more than one year, the
firm uses the subsidy funds to substitute for private funds during the first year of the project—
when the project is being run at a slow pace—but then compensates with increased private
funds as the project's pace picks up. Overall, however, the level of private R&D expenditures
is not significantly changed from what it would have been in the absence of the subsidy: the
sum of both subsidy coefficients is positive but small and not significantly different from zero
(8 percent with a standard deviation of 75 percent).
Allowing for a differential effect of the subsidy on the R&D expenditures of firms with
more than 300 employees (about 20-25 percent of the sample in any given year) does not
affect these results: the "large firm" dummies are individually and collectively not significantly
different from zero.
Along with the timing explanation, the large reduction in the estimated coefficient of D
when D_1 is added to the regression is consistent with a model where current R&D expen-
ditures respond (positively) to the know-how generated by past R&D projects. In this case,
'r in (8) is positively correlated with lagged subsidies implying that, given some persistence
in the subsidy status D, the estimates of the subsidy effect in columns (1)-(3) of Table 10
are biased upward. When D_1 is included in the regression the coefficients of D should be
reduced as in column (4) of Table 10. This type of model, however, also implies that lagged
company-financed R&D ought to be added to the regressions in Table 10. This is done in the
next section where we formulate a dynamic panel data model and estimate the full effects of
the R&D subsidy on company-financed R&D expenditures.
5 Dynamics andtheEffect of the Subsidy Level
We start with an extension of model (8) using q lags of s, the log of the amount of subsidies,
yji =x+ + O + A + (13)
25Besides adding dynamics, this section abandons the use of the binary indicator D in
favor of the level of the R&D subsidy. If the effect of the subsidy kicks in only after a certain
subsidy level is attained, using a binary variable D might miss this type of effect.
The motivation for focusing on the dynamic effects of the R&D subsidy is that subsidies
can affect future expenditures on other R&D projects for a number of reasons mentioned in
Section 2. First, R&D can increase because of within-firm spillovers and the sharing of common
R&D equipment and other fixed costs. Second, when the subsidy is superfluous the private
R&D funds released by the subsidy can be invested in future R&D projects. Third, receiving
a subsidy may signal good news leading to lower costs of financing other R&D projects. On
the other hand, more R&D activity in the present may slow down future projects if the firm
is facing steep R&D costs. The net impact of these effects on future R&D expenditures is
captured by the lagged subsidy terms in (13).
At the end of Section 4 we mentioned an additional channel through which subsidies can
have dynamic effects. The know-how obtained from the firm's R&D projects accumulates over
time making the firm better at doing R&D in a learning-by-doing sense: the productivity of
R&D increases. Moreover, the manner in which R&D is financed may matter. If projects were
subsidized by the OCS in the past, firms may find it cheaper to finance new R&D projects in
the future because of the signal value associated with OCS support. OCS support enhances
the firm's R&D reputation and this lowers financial costs. Thus, the level and composition of
R&D expenditures today can have lasting effects on future R&D expenditures.
Let Wj represent the unobserved know-how and R&D reputation of the firm which is a
part of i,'q=Wj+ whereis a true i.i.d. idiosyncratic zero mean shock, and Wj is
determined in part by past R&D expenditures as follows,
E(wIs_1,yii—i,...)=sj_+ pyj_ (14)






26The coefficients S reflect two types of subsidy effects: the direct effects of the subsidy
mentioned in Section 2 and captured by the a's, and the indirect effects operating through the
know-how and reputation acquired by the firm reflected in the /3's. We can only identify the
total subsidy effect S =a+ j3. Without additional information on the relative size of j3 and
p, we cannot hope to decompose the subsidy effects into its direct and indirect components.
However, in order to assess the effectiveness of the subsidy program, knowledge of S suffices.
We assume that vu is independently distributed across firms but can have arbitrary
heteroskeda.sticity across firms and time. Importantly, we also assume thatis serially uncor-
related within the firm. The idiosyncratic term ej is assumed to be uncorrelated with current
and lagged variables in the model and therefore vt is also uncorrelated with lagged private and
subsidized R&D expenditures,
=0for t ￿ 2 (16)
The additional covariates xt are assumed to be predetermined in the sense that
E(x8vt) =0s <t (17)
s>t
Taking first-differences in (15) to get rid of the firm-specific effects results in,
Yit =x/3+ + py + + vt —vt_ t = q+2, ...,T(18)
OLS estimates of (18) will be inconsistent because Yit—1andpossibly xt are correlated
with Theidentifying assumptions (16) and (17) guarantee that subsidies and own R&D
expenditures lagged two or more periods, ij—2, Yit—2,..., su,ijilareorthogonal to vt —
Thus, levels of s and y lagged two or more periods can serve as instruments. In addition, the
predetermined covariates x_ i, ...,xare also valid instruments in the differenced equation
for period t.Thevalidity of all these instruments rests on the assumption that vt is serially
uncorrelated. To ensure that this condition is met, we will test for serial correlation of the
first-differenced residuals.
It is also possible that current subsidies st are correlated with vt because there may
still be some correlation left between firm-specific but time-varying unobservables (e) and the
subsidy variable. For example, a firm unexpectedly comes up with a new idea for an R&D
27project that leads it to spend more resources on R&D and to request more subsidies. Then, if
this event cannot be controlled for, the subsidy variable sjiscorrelated with v. We will use
the firm's export history (log of exports) as an instrument for s. Subsidies are given to firms
intending to export the outcomes of the subsidized R&D project. This "intention" is likely to
be correlated with past export experience, but this experience is probably not correlated with
unpredicted effects on R&D activities such as the arrival of "new ideas".
We estimate the parameters in (15) by GMM (see Arellano and Bond, 1991), and report
only one-step estimates for which inference based on its heteroskedasticity robust estimated
asymptotic variance matrix is generally thought to be more reliable than the one based on
the more efficient two-step GMM estimator (Blundell and Bond, 1998). The data consist of
all firm-year observations having non-missing data on own R&D, subsidies, employment, sales,
and exports.25 Table 11 presents results for q =1.
Table 11: Estimates of the Subsidy Level Effect
q= 1
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Coefficient of OLS Within First L First z
i—' Cot) 0.779* (.035) 0.082 (.050)-0.029 (.140) -0.003 (.123)
sj (5o) —0.006 (.017)-0.024 (.021)-0.080 (.064) (.063)
si_i (5k) 0.054* (.016)0.044* (.016)-0.089 (.057) -0.061 (.051)
Employment 0.139* (.053)0.233** (.141)0.202 (.321) 0.243 (.297)
Sales 0.053 (.044)0.130* (.052)-0.222 (.140) -0.181 (.131)
m -2.87 -3.96 -0.96 -1.29
m2 0.75 -0.26 -0.75 -0.52
Instruments — — A B
Sargan test (p —value,df)
— — 0.80 (35) 0.91 (45)
N (firms) 766 (221) 545 (193) 545 (193) 545 (193)
Years 1991-1995 1992-19951992-1995 1992-1995
Industry and year dummies included. Asymptotic robust standard errors in parentheses.
A={yj_2 ,... ,Yi,Sj_ ,,Si,empj_2 ,... ,empi,SaleSj_2 ,.. .,salesi,YD's,ID's}
B=AU{expi_2,...,exp1 }.
A *(**) indicatesdifferent from 0 at 5% (10%) significance level. ml and m2 are asymptotically N(0,1) tests for first-order
and second-order serial correlation of first-differenced residuals except in the OLS regression where the residuals are in levels.
Column (1) presents OLS estimates of model (15). These estimates show small, but
significant, lagged subsidy effects. Note that the autoregressive parameter Pi is quite high
indicating, as expected, a lot of persistence in the R&D series. These estimates, however, are
likely to be biased upward because of the presence of firm-specific effects.
25We use DPD98 for Gauss (see Arellano and Bond, 1998). All variables are in logs and in cases where the
original variable was zero the log of that variable was set to zero.
28In column (2), these firm-effects are removed using a (fixed-effect) within estimator.
Estimated subsidy effects are indeed a bit smaller. The estimated autoregressive parameter Pi
is now, however, too small (and not significantly different from zero) as expected due to the
downward bias in the fixed-effect estimator of Pi for small T and positive Pi (Nickell, 1981).
To correct for this inconsistency and for the potential endogeneity of the subsidy regres-
sors, column (3) presents GMM estimates of the parameters of interest using own R&D, the
level of subsidies, employment and sales lagged two or more periods as instruments for yi, sj
and si_i. Subsidy effects are estimated to be more negative but still not significantly different
from zero. The Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions indicates that the instruments are
valid. Adding the firm's exporting history to the list of instruments in column (4) improves
the validity of the instruments and gives marginally significantly negative estimates of the
contemporary subsidy effect.
The results in columns (3) and (4) are problematic because the estimated autoregressive
parameter Pi is even smaller that the one obtained by fixed-effects. In addition, the low values
of m (and m2) indicate that first differenced residuals are serially independent suggesting that
vjisa random walk. This is taken as evidence of a misspecified model.
In the context of GMM estimation of short panels there is, however, another explanation.
Recently, Blundell and Bond (1998) showed that when Pi is moderately large and T is moder-
ately small, the GMM estimator based on the first-differenced equation can be seriously biased
and, in particular, the estimator of Pi is downward biased. When the y series is very persis-
tence, lagged levels of the series are only weakly correlated with the first differences: there may
be a problem of "weak instruments". This would explain the low estimated p. Blundell and
Bond (1998) suggest using additional moment restrictions—the orthogonality between (O + v)
and yj_i— yj_2—whichis valid under stationarity of the initial conditions process z1.Inprac-
tice, we add equations for the level of jjusingthe first differences of y and other regressors as
instruments to the level equations. Table 12 implements this approach.
29Coefficient of (1) (2) (3)
i—i Cot) 0.449* (.086)0.428* (.094) 0.454* (.103)
Yi—2 (P2)
— 0.085 (.060) 0.097 (.061)
sj (5o) 0.034 (.061)-0.078 (.057) -0.076 (.058)
5j_1 (51) 0.002 (.047)0.114* (.044) 0.049 (.060)
Sj_2 (2) 0.061KK (.033) 0.125* (.049)
Employment 0.703* (.234)0.397 (.283) 0.224 (.315)
Sales -0.099 (.116) 0.182 (.246) 0.227 (.252)
Net effect (p-value) 0.036 (.110)0.097* (.023) 0.098** (.061)
m -5.85 -3.72 -3.63
m2 0.00 -1.61 -1.95
Instruments C C D
Sargan test (p-vaue,df) 0.29 (65) 0.08 (58) 0.27 (45)
N (firms) 738 (193) 495 (143) 495 (143)
Years 1991-1995 1992-1995 1992-1995
TJnweighted data. Industry and year dummies included. Asymptotic robust standard errors in parentheses.
A *(**)indicates different from 0 at 5% (10%) significance level.
,empi_2,...,empl ,salesj_2,...,salesl,
expj_2, ...,exp,YD's,ID's}U{Lyj_i ,sj_ ,empj_ 1 ,salesj_ 1 }
.,y,emp_2 ,... ,emp1,salesj_2 ,
expj_2,...,exp1,YD's,ID's}U{Lyj_1 ,Lempj_1 4saiesj_ 1 }
mland m2 are asymptotically N(0,1) tests for first-order and second-order serial correlation
of first-differenced residuals.
The autoregressive coefficients are sensible in all regressions and the serial correlation
tests suggest the presence of first-order serial correlation only in the first-differenced residual,
as expected when Vj is serially independent. When using two lags, the list of instruments C is
only marginally valid possibly because lagged subsidies are included.26 Excluding them from
the instrument list (for the differenced and level equations) gives a more satisfactory set of
instruments according to the Sargan test (list D in column (3)).
The lagged subsidy coefficients change considerably relative to those in Table 11: they
are now positive and more precisely estimated. The immediate impact of the subsidy remains
negative (columns (2) and (3)) or very small, column (1). The sum of the subsidy coefficients
is about 0.10 and significantly different from zero. Adding a third lag of y and s results in the
same point estimate of the net effects (about 0.11) but is less precisely estimated. 27 Note that
26The form the instruments take are levels lagged two or more periods for the first differenced equations, and
lagged first-differences for the level equations.
27The third lag of s and y is not significant.
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Table 12: GMM Estimates of the Subsidy Level Effect
First Differences and Level Equationsthe pattern of the coefficients resembles the pattern in column (4 of Table 10 except that now
the net effect is significantly positive.
The long-run effect of the subsidy takes account of the autoregressive component in
y and is approximately equal to 1_o.2!o.o970.22. That is, a 10 percent increase in the
current subsidy level leads to an increase of 2.2 percent in long-run company-financed R&D
expenditures. Government subsidies did not crowd out private R&D expenditures in the long-
run. On the contrary, private expenditures were increased by the subsidy. Dividing 0.22 by
gives the marginal effect of a subsidy dollar. Using the average subsidy-private R&D ratio
in the data—about 54 percent (Table 2)—we obtain a marginal effect of 0.41. 28That is, an
extra subsidy dollar increases company-financed R&D expenditures by 41 cents on average in
the long-run. We cannot reject the hypothesis that large firms have the same subsidy effect
as small firms (p-value 0.17) but large firms have, on average, a smallerratio (38 percent).
Thus, an additional dollar of R&D subsidy to large firms increases their long-run private R&D
expenditures by 58 cents on average. In this sense, the subsidy program elicits a stronger
response from large than from smaller firms.
Although significantly positive, the subsidy effect is substantially lower what could have
been expected a-priori given the dollar-by-dollar matching upon which most subsidies are based.
The reasons for this "less than full" effect lie in that the subsidies are sometimes granted
to projects that would have been undertaken even without the subsidy, and in that firms
adjust their portfolio of R&D projects—closing or slowing down non-subsidized projects—after
the subsidy is received.29
6 Conclusions
This paper analyzes the effects of R&D subsidies on company-financed R&D using data on
Israeli manufacturing firms during 1990-1995. The R&D subsidy effect is defined as the average
28We use a log-log model because it allows for variation in the marginal effect whereas a linear model assumes
the same effect at any level of subsidies.
291f we assume that the funding source of R&D does not affect the know-how and reputation state w then
=i' andwe find, in general, that &- =5— is significantly negative. Were we to assume that subsidized
R&D is half as productive as private R&D, /3 = wewould still find negative a's.Theseresults, albeit
crude, suggest that R&D subsidies work in subtle ways: on the one hand they crowd out company-financed
R&D expenditures—the negative a's—possibly because in some cases the subsidies are superfluous while in
other instances the implementation of the subsidized project forces the firm to close or scale down other non-
subsidized projects. But, on the other hand, the know-how obtained from R&D projects to which the subsidies
contribute and the R&D reputation boosted by the OCS support have strong effects on future company-financed
R&D expenditures. Overall, the effect on company-financed R&D is positive. This suggests that empirically
identi'ing the channels through which subsidies affect R&D activities can be an interesting and fruitful research
project.
31percentage change in company-financed R&D expenditures between what was actually observed
among firms that received a subsidy and what these firms would have spent had the subsidy
not been received.
We explore a variety of channels through which the subsidy operates. Some of these
channels affect private R&D positively and some affect it negatively. For example, the subsidy
can turn a privately unprofitable project into a profitable one and, through spillovers and cost-
sharing effects, it may even prompt the firm to implement additional non-subsidized projects.
On the other hand, the commitment to implement the subsidized project may crowd-out other
previously profitable projects when the firm is constrained by its stock of skilled R&D labor
or by liquidity considerations. Subsidizing projects that would have been undertaken by the
firm even in the absence of the subsidy contribute to a negative subsidy effect. But, even if
the subsidy is superfluous, the funds released by the subsidy can finance other R&D projects
so that the subsidy only partially crowds-out private R&D expenditures. The paper focuses
on estimating the net effect of the subsidy on private R&D; the distribution of these effects
through the different channels is left for future research.
The first empirical approach borrows from the "treatment effect" literature using a DID
estimator to estimate the effect of receiving an R&D subsidy. This results in positive but
insignificant subsidy effects on private R&D. These results also highlight the importance of
dynamics in the effect of R&D subsidies on private R&D as discussed in Section 2. The DID
approach, although very clear in its interpretation of the parameters and in its capability of
handling selection biases, is less well suited to tackle the estimation of dynamic models. In
Section 5, we estimate a dynamic panel data model which takes account of the endogeneity
of current subsidies. After some diagnostic tests are passed, the final specification implies
that OCS subsidies do not crowd out company-financed R&D expenditures. Their long-run
elasticity with respect to R&D subsidies is 0.22. At the means of the data, an additional dollar
of R&D subsidy increase company-financed R&D expenditures by 41 cents on average in the
long-run. Total R&D expenditures increase, of course, by 1.41 dollars.
This is a large effect. Even though it is large enough to justify the existence of the OCS
subsidy program, the subsidy effect is lower than expected given the dollar-by-dollar matching
upon which most subsidized projects are based. This "less than full" effect reflects two inherent
aspects of the subsidy program identified in the paper: first, subsidies are sometimes granted to
projects that would have been undertaken even in the absence of the subsidy and, second, firms
adjust their portfolio of R&D projects—closing or slowing down non-subsidized projects—after
the subsidy is received. These considerations should be taken into account when formulating a
32coherent R&Dsubsidypolicy.
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35A Appendix
In this appendix we show the equivalence in estimating ci between the standard linear econo-
metric model and the difference by support status.
Assume that R&D expenditures for non-supported and supported firms at t satisfy
yX8+5i+6 (19)
where the error terms are assumed uncorrelated with x, a kxlvector of firm characteristics,
E(6°Ix)= 0and E(6'Ix) =Note that the subsidy impact is allowed to differ across firms.
Following Heckman's (1995) general treatment of this issue, observed R&D expenditures
of firm i in the group of firms defined by D_1 =0can be written as
yjj = +(1 — = xj3+ D(5 + —+
which resembles a regression model with a random coefficient for the regressor D.
The effect of the subsidy—the coefficient of D—varies across firms and time depending
on — and 5. When the error term is the same in both subsidy states,— = 0and
the subsidy effect is homogeneous, the effect of the subsidy is always the same for all firms and
in all years. Then the model reduces to the standard dummy-variable framework used in most
applied work.
Let Vj = and 5j =5+ . Observed R&D can then be written as
yj =xJ3 ++ + D [ + v]
=xJ3 + D5* + + [ + Vj—E( + vx, D = 1,D_1= 0)]
=xJ3 +D5*+ + Wj (20)
where
=5+ E( + vjx, =1,D_1 =0)
Wj =[ + Vj—E( + vjx,= 1,D_1= 0)]
Note that (20) has the same form as equation (7).
But what is 5 measuring? The effect of treatment on the treated is by definition a =
E(y
— =1,D_1 =0).Taking expectations of (19) we obtain,
30A linear projection argument would make 0(1) andx uncorrelated by construction. In this case, however,
/3 has no causal interpreation.
36=
=E(5 + vjx, = 1, D_1 = 0)
= 5+E(j+viiIx,Di=1,Dii_l=0)==*.
Thus, 5 is measuring the effect of treatment on the treated, conditional on x. The effect of
treatment on the treated can be decomposed into the change in R&D expenditures for the
average firm in the population, 5, plus a term E( + Vj Ix,=1,D_1 =0)indicating how
much the change for recipient firms differs from the average change that would be experienced
by a firm picked up at random from the entire population of firms.
We just showed that the parameter of interest c can be expressed as the coefficient of D
in a regression model relating R&D expenditures to a vector of covariates and to the subsidy
dummy. Note that Wj in (20) is by construction always mean independent ofso that the
only source of correlation between the error term and the subsidy dummy may arise from .
Thus,a sufficient requirement for consistency of the OLS estimator of 5 (and of /3) in (20) is
that, conditional on x and D_1 =0,andbe mean independent as required by (6).
37